Abstract
We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 585-601 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Economic Theory |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 1998 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics