Abstract
The human being is freely ‘self-determined’ rather than determined through some external authority (whether theological or teleological). This dichotomy conveniently expresses the usual understanding of modern political thought’s divergence from preceding tradition. By comparison, pre-modernity is teleological, anthropomorphic, realist; in a word, naïve – with its substantively rational nature, dictating essential ends to which we are subject. These received truths are past due for a re-examination. Just how naïve or dogmatic was the Greek understanding of freedom and nature? In this chapter, I argue that Plato’s view of man as naturally political is more complex and multivalent than our historical categorizations allow. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which, for him, politics does indeed depend upon a natural model. That model, however, is the Idea of the Good. And here, where Plato seems furthest from us, lies his greatest challenge to contemporary understandings of nature and freedom.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Platonic Autonomy Self-Determination |
| Subtitle of host publication | Self-Determination, Unity, and Cooperation |
| Editors | Olof Pattersson, Pauliina Remes |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Chapter | 11 |
| Pages | 235-255 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781009520461 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 7 Aug 2025 |