The network industry, monopoly regulation, and social optimum

Uriel Spiegel, Uri Ben-Zion, Tchai Tavor, Joseph Templeman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


This paper examines pricing policy, quality levels, consumer surplus and social welfare for the monopoly and non-monopoly case. It is shown that given certain realistic assumptions, the network industry under unregulated monopoly would yield more social welfare than in the case of several producers in the industry, and would therefore be socially preferred.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)323-337
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of the Economics of Business
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2008


  • Duopoly
  • Monopoly
  • Network externalities
  • Quality
  • Social optimum


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