Abstract
We study the optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players. We characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium in these tournaments with either one or two prizes. Our results show that the players who wish to maximize their expected payoffs or their probabilities of winning have different preferences about the order of games under tournaments with one or two prizes. We analyze the optimal allocations of players for a designer who wishes to maximize the players’ expected total effort in the tournaments with one and two prizes, and by comparing between them, it is demonstrated that in order to maximize the players’ expected total effort the designer should allocate only one prize.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 379-396 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Journal of Scheduling |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jun 2020 |
Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- First-mover advantage
- Multi-stage contests
- Round-robin tournaments
- Second-mover advantage
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- General Engineering
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Artificial Intelligence