The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Paul Schweinzer, Ella Segev

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

34 Scopus citations


We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts. If no such optimal equilibrium exists, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)69-82
Number of pages14
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2012


  • Incentive structures
  • Rent seeking
  • Tournaments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics


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