Abstract
We study a best-of-three all-pay contestwith two players inwhich the first player to win two games wins the contest. Each player has a value of winning the contest as well as a value ofwinning a single game. It is assumed that a player’s value ofwinning a game in his home field is higher than his value of winning a game away from home. The stronger player (the player with the higher value of winning the contest) plays twice at his home field and once away from it.We analyze the order of games that both players agree to, according to which no one has an incentive to switch to a different order, since switchingwould not yield a higher expected payoff. In this order, theweaker player plays at his home field in the first stage and then plays two games at the stronger player’s field.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 185-200 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Sports Economics |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Feb 2015 |
Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- Best-of-three contests
- Winner-take-all contests
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)