TY - JOUR
T1 - The power of the weak
T2 - When altruism is the equilibrium
AU - Barkan, Rachel
AU - Lahav, Yaron
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.
PY - 2023/5/1
Y1 - 2023/5/1
N2 - A rational economic analysis complements Grossmann's fearful ape hypothesis. Two examples of mixed-motive games with strong inter-dependence (i.e., weak chirping nestling, boxed pigs) demonstrate that signaling weakness is a dominant strategy. Weakness elicits cooperative, caring response, comprising the equilibrium of the game. In extensive form, a reliable reputation of weakness elicits caring as a sequential equilibrium.
AB - A rational economic analysis complements Grossmann's fearful ape hypothesis. Two examples of mixed-motive games with strong inter-dependence (i.e., weak chirping nestling, boxed pigs) demonstrate that signaling weakness is a dominant strategy. Weakness elicits cooperative, caring response, comprising the equilibrium of the game. In extensive form, a reliable reputation of weakness elicits caring as a sequential equilibrium.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85159700383&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0140525X22002011
DO - 10.1017/S0140525X22002011
M3 - Review article
C2 - 37154373
AN - SCOPUS:85159700383
SN - 0140-525X
VL - 46
JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences
JF - Behavioral and Brain Sciences
M1 - e54
ER -