TY - GEN
T1 - The Power of Default
T2 - 28th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2024
AU - Chemaya, Nir
AU - Liu, Dingyue
AU - McLaughlin, Robert
AU - Ruaro, Nicola
AU - Kruegel, Christopher
AU - Vigna, Giovanni
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© International Financial Cryptography Association 2025.
PY - 2025/1/1
Y1 - 2025/1/1
N2 - In recent years, we have seen the growth of decentralized finance (DeFi), an ecosystem of financial applications and protocols that enable complex, automated, permissionless financial transactions in blockchains (such as Ethereum). We examine decentralized exchanges (DEX), a key DeFi component that facilitates token swaps. DEX prices update continuously and automatically after each swap, creating price shifts for users as their swaps (trades) wait to execute. Users protect themselves from these price shifts by setting a slippage tolerance, which represents the maximum acceptable price increase. This setting is a double-edged sword: lenient tolerance can be exploited through sandwich attacks, which cost the ecosystem over $100 million annually, but stricter tolerance may cause unnecessary failures. We perform a large-scale measurement of the impact of slippage tolerance settings on the health of the Uniswap and Sushiswap DEX ecosystems. To this end, we examine a recent change in Uniswap’s default slippage setting, which aimed to mitigate sandwich attacks without increasing the likelihood of transaction failures. This change removed the prior, static default – 0.5% – in favor of one dynamically computed for each transaction based on market conditions so that sandwich attacks are less profitable. We find that, overall, Uniswap’s new default slippage setting leads to a substantial reduction in Uniswap traders’ losses, approximately 54.7%. The effect is even more pronounced 90% when we only consider traders who followed the default settings.
AB - In recent years, we have seen the growth of decentralized finance (DeFi), an ecosystem of financial applications and protocols that enable complex, automated, permissionless financial transactions in blockchains (such as Ethereum). We examine decentralized exchanges (DEX), a key DeFi component that facilitates token swaps. DEX prices update continuously and automatically after each swap, creating price shifts for users as their swaps (trades) wait to execute. Users protect themselves from these price shifts by setting a slippage tolerance, which represents the maximum acceptable price increase. This setting is a double-edged sword: lenient tolerance can be exploited through sandwich attacks, which cost the ecosystem over $100 million annually, but stricter tolerance may cause unnecessary failures. We perform a large-scale measurement of the impact of slippage tolerance settings on the health of the Uniswap and Sushiswap DEX ecosystems. To this end, we examine a recent change in Uniswap’s default slippage setting, which aimed to mitigate sandwich attacks without increasing the likelihood of transaction failures. This change removed the prior, static default – 0.5% – in favor of one dynamically computed for each transaction based on market conditions so that sandwich attacks are less profitable. We find that, overall, Uniswap’s new default slippage setting leads to a substantial reduction in Uniswap traders’ losses, approximately 54.7%. The effect is even more pronounced 90% when we only consider traders who followed the default settings.
KW - Automated Market Makers
KW - Blockchain
KW - DeFi
KW - Default Effect
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/86000205580
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-78676-1_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-78676-1_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:86000205580
SN - 9783031786754
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 192
EP - 208
BT - Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 28th International Conference, FC 2024, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Clark, Jeremy
A2 - Shi, Elaine
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 4 March 2024 through 8 March 2024
ER -