The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The concept of proto-ethics is missing in ethical theory. It refers to a domain that is evaluative in an ethically-relevant sense, but falls short of moral prescriptivity. In this paper I explore the characteristics of the proto-ethical with an emphasis on the role of mood and affect, especially with reference to Heidegger’s concept of attunement (Befiendlichkeit). I explain the sense in which the moody aspect of human existence forms necessary (but insufficient) conditions for the possibility and intelligibility of ethics.

Original languageEnglish GB
Title of host publicationPhilosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking
EditorsHagi Kenaan, Ilit Ferber
PublisherSpringer, Dordrecht
Pages173-184
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)978-94-007-1503-5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameContributions To Phenomenology
Volume63
ISSN (Print)0923-9545
ISSN (Electronic)2215-1915

Keywords

  • Ethical Judgment
  • Evaluative Dimension
  • Human Dignity
  • Moral Judgment
  • Ontological Structure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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