The regulation of environmental innovations

Yacov Tsur, Amos Zemel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


We offer mechanisms to regulate environmental R&D projects that are intertemporal and indivisible and involve high monitoring cost. Screening and contracting the R&D performer are based solely on the project completion time. When the project duration is ex ante uncertain to all parties (including the performing firm), the mechanism is formulated in terms of a completion time limit. The mechanism extends to other intertemporal public projects as well as to principal-agent settings with dynamic agent's tasks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)242-260
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2002


  • Auction
  • Environmental regulation
  • Incentive contracts
  • Intertemporal projects
  • Pollution abatement
  • R&D

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law


Dive into the research topics of 'The regulation of environmental innovations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this