Abstract
It is shown that the restriction of the Shapley value to the lattice of all monotonic games whose range is contained in an arbitrary set of non-negative real numbers (which contains 0) can be uniquely characterized by the axioms that were given by Dubey (in order to characterize the Shapley value on the class of monotonic simple games). We also derive formulas for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in terms of the minimal winning coalitions of the game.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 1-10 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1988 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Banzhaf value
- Monotonic game
- Shapley value
- simple game
- valuation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences (all)
- Psychology (all)
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty