The socially acceptable scoring rule

Muhammad Mahajne; Oscar Volij

doi:10.1007/s00355-018-1113-9

The socially acceptable scoring rule

Muhammad Mahajne, Oscar Volij

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals that rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals that rank it among the least preferred half. We show that there exists a unique scoring rule that always selects a subset of socially acceptable alternatives.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	223-233
Number of pages	11
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	51
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1113-9
State	Published - 1 Aug 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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The socially acceptable scoring rule

Abstract

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