@techreport{30763a0a47ca49faad8aa37ae7e14ae9,
title = "The transfer pricing problem: a mixed mechanism approach",
abstract = "We consider a decentralized firm with one selling division and one buying division with asymmetric information about the cost functions of the two divisions. We show that there is a mechanism which achieves efficiency, truth-telling via dominant, individual strategies, individual rationality and achieves almost budget balancing for a large class of cost structures. ",
keywords = "Transfer Pricing, Mechanism Design, Decentralization",
author = "Arieh Gavious and Yair Tauman",
year = "1997",
language = "English",
series = "Working paper (Israel Institute of business Research)",
publisher = "The Israel Institute of Business Research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Israel Institute of Business Research",
}