The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees

Ruth Ben-Yashar, Leif Danziger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then allocate adjacent experts such that an expert's ability tends to vary inversely with the size of his committee. In the special case of three-member committees, we show that the optimal allocation maximizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-112
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
StatePublished - 1 May 2016


  • Extremely asymmetric committees
  • Optimal composition of committees
  • Unanimity rule

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


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