The value of a draw

Casilda Lasso de la Vega, Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


We model a match as a recursive zero-sum game with three possible outcomes: Player 1 wins, player 2 wins, or there is a draw. We focus on matches whose point games also have three possible outcomes: Player 1 scores the point, player 2 scores the point, or the point is drawn in which case the point game is repeated. We show that a value of a draw can be attached to each state so that an easily computed stationary equilibrium exists in which players’ strategies can be described as minimax behavior in the point games induced by these values.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1023-1044
Number of pages22
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2020


  • Draws
  • Matches
  • Recursive games
  • Stochastic games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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