Tradeoffs between incentive mechanisms in boolean games

Vadim Levit, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsMichael Wooldridge, Qiang Yang
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages68-74
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357384
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2015
Event24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015 - Buenos Aires, Argentina
Duration: 25 Jul 201531 Jul 2015

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2015-January
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015
Country/TerritoryArgentina
CityBuenos Aires
Period25/07/1531/07/15

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Tradeoffs between incentive mechanisms in boolean games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this