@article{30ee0430b1084c308914e2fef7da7dae,
title = "Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism",
abstract = "We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage realized returns.",
keywords = "Investment game, Reward schemes, Screening problem",
author = "David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer",
note = "Funding Information: The authors wish to thank Eddie Dekel, David Gilo, Zvika Neeman, Dotan Persitz, David Schmeidler, Eilon Solan, Avi Wohl, two anonymous reviewers and the associate editor for their valuable comments, as well as the participants of Games 2016, the 2017 Research Workshop in honor of Ehud Kalai, the Tel-Aviv University Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Seminar, the Strategy Seminar of the Tel-Aviv University Business School. Lagziel and Lehrer acknowledge the support of the Israel Science Foundation, Grant #963/15. An earlier version of this paper was titled “The Tried-Stone Scheme & a Million Dollar Bet”. Both authors have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Funding Information: The authors wish to thank Eddie Dekel, David Gilo, Zvika Neeman, Dotan Persitz, David Schmeidler, Eilon Solan, Avi Wohl, two anonymous reviewers and the associate editor for their valuable comments, as well as the participants of Games 2016, the 2017 Research Workshop in honor of Ehud Kalai, the Tel-Aviv University Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Seminar, the Strategy Seminar of the Tel-Aviv University Business School. Lagziel and Lehrer acknowledge the support of the Israel Science Foundation, Grant #963/15. An earlier version of this paper was titled “The Tried-Stone Scheme & a Million Dollar Bet”. Both authors have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.",
year = "2021",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2",
language = "English",
volume = "71",
pages = "483--504",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",
}