Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism

David Lagziel; Ehud Lehrer

doi:10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2

Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism

David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage realized returns.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	483-504
Number of pages	22
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	71
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2
State	Published - 1 Mar 2021

Keywords

Investment game
Reward schemes
Screening problem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2

Cite this

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title = "Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism",

abstract = "We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage realized returns.",

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Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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