@inproceedings{241b18fbc49e4e908e9531981c587bf4,
title = "Transmission investment cost allocation within the cooperative game framework",
abstract = "This paper identifies the situations in which transmission investment are good for society as a whole but not necessarily for each agent. Regarding these situations, we define the rules for the allocation of transmission investment costs from the perspective of cooperative game theory. The main idea is that each investment cost allocation problem can be formulated into a cooperative game. Then one can apply well-known game theoretic solutions concepts such as the Shapley Value, core and nucleolus to the game induced by the cost allocation problem and obtain the corresponding cost allocations.",
keywords = "Allocation rule, Bankruptcy problem, Cooperative game, Core, Nucleolus, Shapley value",
author = "Wenzhuo Shang and Oscar Volij",
year = "2006",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1109/PSCE.2006.296229",
language = "English",
isbn = "142440178X",
series = "2006 IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition, PSCE 2006 - Proceedings",
pages = "1971--1977",
booktitle = "2006 IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition, PSCE 2006 - Proceedings",
note = "2006 IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition, PSCE 2006 ; Conference date: 29-10-2006 Through 01-11-2006",
}