Two-Dimensionalism and the "Knowing Which" Requirement

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Two-dimensional semantics aims to eliminate the puzzle of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths. Recently many argue that even assuming two-dimensional semantics we are left with the puzzle of necessary and a posteriori propositions. Stephen Yablo (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 98–122, 2000) and Penelope Mackie (Analysis, 62(3), 225–236, 2002) argue that a plausible sense of “knowing which” lets us know the object of such a proposition, and yet its necessity is “hidden” and thus a posteriori. This paper answers this objection; I argue that given two-dimensional semantics you cannot know a necessary proposition without knowing that it is true.
Original languageEnglish GB
Pages (from-to)55-67
JournalActa Analytica
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2008


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