Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic substitutes, which provide a powerful rationale for staggering. We show that for realistic parameter values, there is a continuum of possible equilibria with various degrees of staggering of long contracts. If the contracting cost is not too large, then the lowest possible degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost and increases with monetary uncertainty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1038-1049
Number of pages12
JournalLabour Economics
Issue number6
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2010


  • Contract duration
  • Monetary policy shocks
  • Nonuniform staggering
  • Strategic substitutability
  • Uniform staggering
  • Wage contracts

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management


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