TY - JOUR
T1 - Values for environments with externalities – The average approach
AU - Macho-Stadler, Inés
AU - Pérez-Castrillo, David
AU - Wettstein, David
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2018/3/1
Y1 - 2018/3/1
N2 - We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the λ-egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.
AB - We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the λ-egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.
KW - Average approach
KW - Externalities
KW - Sharing the surplus
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85028356250&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.003
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85028356250
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 108
SP - 49
EP - 64
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -