Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

Eyal Baharad, Leif Danziger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)129-151
Number of pages23
JournalGroup Decision and Negotiation
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2018


  • Committee decisions
  • Scoring rules
  • “Almost” voting rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • General Social Sciences
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation


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