Vulnerability of secured IoT memory against localized back side laser fault injection

David Zooker Zabib, Maoz Vizentovski, Alexander Fish, Osnat Keren, Yoav Weizman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Devices aimed for the Internet of Things (loT) market are required to be both low cost and highly secured, as they are expected to be integrated in ordinary 'things' while storing and processing sensitive information. In this paper we examine the vulnerabilities of a commercial secured IoT memory chip to precise and localized back-side laser fault injection. We explain the different steps needed in order to prepare the sample, and describe the laser fault injection setup. From the experiments we conclude that the chip relies mostly on physical countermeasures which renders obsolete in this kind of attack. Further more, the experiments stress the necessity for sophisticated Error Detecting Codes in order to efficiently protect the integrity of the sensitive information stored and processed in the chip.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2017 7th International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies, EST 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages7-11
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781538640173
DOIs
StatePublished - 30 Oct 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event7th International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies, EST 2017 - Canterbury, United Kingdom
Duration: 6 Sep 20178 Sep 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2017 7th International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies, EST 2017

Conference

Conference7th International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies, EST 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityCanterbury
Period6/09/178/09/17

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