Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting

Roy Fairstein, Dan Vilenchik, Reshef Meir, Kobi Gal

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

8 Scopus citations


Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate participants' votes. A recent paper by Lackner and Skowron [12] studied the tradeoff between notions of social welfare and representation in the multi-winner voting, which is a special case of participatory budgeting with identical project costs. But there is little understanding of this trade-off in the more general PB setting. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical study of the worst-case guarantees of several common rules to better understand the trade-off between social welfare and representation. We show that many of the guarantees from the multi-winner setting do not generalize to the PB setting, and that the introduction of costs leads to substantially worse guarantees, thereby exacerbating the welfare-representation trade-off. We further study how the requirement of proportionality over voting rules effects the guarantees on social welfare and representation. We study the latter point also empirically, both on real and synthetic datasets. We show that variants of the recently suggested voting rule Rule-X (which satisfies proportionality) do very well in practice both with respect to social welfare and representation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781713854333
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2022
Event21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022 - Auckland, Virtual, New Zealand
Duration: 9 May 202213 May 2022

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914


Conference21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022
Country/TerritoryNew Zealand
CityAuckland, Virtual


  • Fairness
  • Participatory budgeting
  • Social Choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering


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