What do multiwinner voting rules do? an experiment over the two-dimensional euclidean domain

Edith Elkind; Piotr Faliszewski; Jean François Laslier; Piotr Skowron; Arkadii Slinko; Nimrod Talmon

What do multiwinner voting rules do? an experiment over the two-dimensional euclidean domain

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean François Laslier, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

52 Scopus citations

Abstract

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules-SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV-for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

Original language	English
Pages	494-501
Number of pages	8
State	Published - 1 Jan 2017
Externally published	Yes
Event	31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 - San Francisco, United States Duration: 4 Feb 2017 → 10 Feb 2017

Conference

Conference	31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017
Country/Territory	United States
City	San Francisco
Period	4/02/17 → 10/02/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

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title = "What do multiwinner voting rules do? an experiment over the two-dimensional euclidean domain",

abstract = "We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules-SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV-for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.",

author = "Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski and Laslier, {Jean Fran{\c c}ois} and Piotr Skowron and Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon",

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AU - Elkind, Edith

AU - Faliszewski, Piotr

AU - Laslier, Jean François

AU - Skowron, Piotr

AU - Slinko, Arkadii

AU - Talmon, Nimrod

PY - 2017/1/1

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N2 - We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules-SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV-for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

AB - We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules-SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV-for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

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M3 - Paper

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T2 - 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017

Y2 - 4 February 2017 through 10 February 2017

ER -

What do multiwinner voting rules do? an experiment over the two-dimensional euclidean domain

Abstract

Conference

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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