What do multiwinner voting rules do? an experiment over the two-dimensional euclidean domain

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean François Laslier, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules-SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV-for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages494-501
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: 4 Feb 201710 Feb 2017

Conference

Conference31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period4/02/1710/02/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence

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