When one decides for many: The effect of delegation methods on cooperation in simulated inter-group conflicts

Ramzi Suleiman, Ilan Fischer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The study explores the evolution of decision strategies and the emergence of cooperation in simulated societies. In the context of an inter-group conflict, we simulate three different institutions for the aggregation of attitudes. We assume that: (a) the conflict can be modeled as an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma played by two decision makers, each representing her group for a fixed duration; (b) the performance of each group's representative influences her group members and, consequently, her prospects to be reelected. Our main objectives are: (1) to investigate the effects of three power-delegation mechanisms: Random Representation, Mean Representation, and Minimal Winning Coalition representation, on the emergence of representatives' decision strategies, (2) to investigate the effect of the frequency of elections on the evolving inter-group relations. Outcomes of 1080 simulations show that the emergence of cooperation is strongly influenced by the delegation mechanism, the election frequency, and the interaction between these two factors.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJASSS
Volume3
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2000

Keywords

  • Elections frequency
  • Evolution of cooperation
  • Intergroup conflict
  • Prisoner's Dilemma
  • Representation
  • Social influence

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