Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism

  • Simon Johnson
  • , Daniel Kaufmann
  • , John McMillan
  • , Christopher Woodruff

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

300 Scopus citations

Abstract

Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden 'unofficial' activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)495-520
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume76
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2000
Externally publishedYes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 9 - Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
    SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
  2. SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
    SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

  • Corruption
  • H26
  • K42
  • Legal system
  • O17
  • Taxation
  • Unofficial economy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this