TY - JOUR
T1 - Why inconsistent intentional states underlie our grasp of objects
AU - Golan, Rea
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Authors. The Southern Journal of Philosophy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of University of Memphis.
PY - 2024/6/1
Y1 - 2024/6/1
N2 - Several authors maintain that we are capable of having inconsistent intentional states, either in cases of illusion, in certain cases of imagination, or because the observable world is (partly) inconsistent and we perceive it as such. These views are all premised on the assumption that inconsistent intentional states—even if acknowledged—are peculiar and have nothing essential to do with our perceptual capacities. In the present article, I would like to present, and argue for, a much stronger thesis: that inconsistent intentional states underlie the possibility of having intentional content in mind. I argue for this thesis based on a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of our grasp of objects, which I formulate in terms of incompatibility semantics.
AB - Several authors maintain that we are capable of having inconsistent intentional states, either in cases of illusion, in certain cases of imagination, or because the observable world is (partly) inconsistent and we perceive it as such. These views are all premised on the assumption that inconsistent intentional states—even if acknowledged—are peculiar and have nothing essential to do with our perceptual capacities. In the present article, I would like to present, and argue for, a much stronger thesis: that inconsistent intentional states underlie the possibility of having intentional content in mind. I argue for this thesis based on a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of our grasp of objects, which I formulate in terms of incompatibility semantics.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85176209711&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/sjp.12549
DO - 10.1111/sjp.12549
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85176209711
SN - 0038-4283
VL - 62
SP - 178
EP - 192
JO - Southern Journal of Philosophy
JF - Southern Journal of Philosophy
IS - 2
ER -