Winner-pay contests with a no-winner possibility

Yizhaq Minchuk

doi:10.1002/mde.3495

Winner-pay contests with a no-winner possibility

Yizhaq Minchuk

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study winner-pay Tullock contests with a no-win parameter that reflects the likelihood that nobody will win the contest, in a symmetric model with complete information. We show that in contradiction to standard Tullock contests with a no-win parameter, the increase in the no-win parameter results in higher efforts. Additionally, a no-win parameter will result in lower revenues for the contest designer and lower contestants profits than standard winner-pay contests. We additionally extended our work to the asymmetric case and equivalent contests.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1874-1879
Number of pages	6
Journal	Managerial and Decision Economics
Volume	43
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3495
State	Published - 1 Sep 2022
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Business and International Management
Strategy and Management
Management Science and Operations Research
Management of Technology and Innovation

Access to Document

10.1002/mde.3495

Cite this

@article{f59bc17f2a09471a9007d999f9cd6063,

title = "Winner-pay contests with a no-winner possibility",

abstract = "We study winner-pay Tullock contests with a no-win parameter that reflects the likelihood that nobody will win the contest, in a symmetric model with complete information. We show that in contradiction to standard Tullock contests with a no-win parameter, the increase in the no-win parameter results in higher efforts. Additionally, a no-win parameter will result in lower revenues for the contest designer and lower contestants profits than standard winner-pay contests. We additionally extended our work to the asymmetric case and equivalent contests.",

author = "Yizhaq Minchuk",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.",

year = "2022",

month = sep,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1002/mde.3495",

language = "English",

volume = "43",

pages = "1874--1879",

journal = "Managerial and Decision Economics",

issn = "0143-6570",

publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",

number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Winner-pay contests with a no-winner possibility

AU - Minchuk, Yizhaq

PY - 2022/9/1

Y1 - 2022/9/1

N2 - We study winner-pay Tullock contests with a no-win parameter that reflects the likelihood that nobody will win the contest, in a symmetric model with complete information. We show that in contradiction to standard Tullock contests with a no-win parameter, the increase in the no-win parameter results in higher efforts. Additionally, a no-win parameter will result in lower revenues for the contest designer and lower contestants profits than standard winner-pay contests. We additionally extended our work to the asymmetric case and equivalent contests.

AB - We study winner-pay Tullock contests with a no-win parameter that reflects the likelihood that nobody will win the contest, in a symmetric model with complete information. We show that in contradiction to standard Tullock contests with a no-win parameter, the increase in the no-win parameter results in higher efforts. Additionally, a no-win parameter will result in lower revenues for the contest designer and lower contestants profits than standard winner-pay contests. We additionally extended our work to the asymmetric case and equivalent contests.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85118949541

U2 - 10.1002/mde.3495

DO - 10.1002/mde.3495

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85118949541

SN - 0143-6570

VL - 43

SP - 1874

EP - 1879

JO - Managerial and Decision Economics

JF - Managerial and Decision Economics

IS - 6

ER -

Winner-pay contests with a no-winner possibility

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this