You play (an action) only once

Karl H. Schlag, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). Such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. Assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)299-303
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Jun 1998
Externally publishedYes


  • C72
  • Repeated games
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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