You play (an action) only once

Karl H. Schlag; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00067-6

You play (an action) only once

Karl H. Schlag
, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). Such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. Assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	299-303
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	59
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00067-6
State	Published - 1 Jun 1998
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

C72
Repeated games
Subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00067-6

Cite this

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title = "You play (an action) only once",

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year = "1998",

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T1 - You play (an action) only once

AU - Schlag, Karl H.

AU - Sela, Aner

PY - 1998/6/1

Y1 - 1998/6/1

N2 - Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). Such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. Assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.

AB - Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). Such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. Assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.

KW - C72

KW - Repeated games

KW - Subgame perfect equilibrium

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0032390664

U2 - 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00067-6

DO - 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00067-6

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0032390664

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 59

SP - 299

EP - 303

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

You play (an action) only once

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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